Users share the cost of unreliable non rival projects (items). For instance they pay today for R&D that may deliver a cure to some viruses, they pay for the edges of a network that will cover their connectivity needs, but the edges may fail, and so on. Each user has a binary inelastic need that is served if and only if certain subsets of items are actually functioning. We ask how should the cost be divided when individual needs are heterogenous. To reach a simple and transparent division method, we impose three powerful separability properties:
Introduction
The problem: A group of users share a set A of non rival projects (items) a, b, · · · , that have limited reliability so may fail. Each item has a cost c a , c b , · · · , and all costs must be paid ex ante (today), but success of the projects (tomorrow) is random. Failed projects are useless, but successful ones help the users to satisfy a binary and inelastic demand for service.
For instance each item is an edge in a communication network that will be turned on (success) or off (failure), and each user has specific individual connectivity needs: to connect a pair of nodes of the network; to connect them by at least k disjoint paths (to allow k independent communications); to connect three or more specific nodes by at least a spanning tree; and so on. History is full of such examples: Trade needs safe routes for commodity transportation and keeping routes safe is costly both at land and on sea. Associations of merchants (as e.g., the German Hansa, see Hougaard and Tvede, 2015) has throughout history shared those costs based on their trade patterns (connectivity needs) and the reliability (safety) of the routes.
Also, R&D projects may fail to meet the goal tomorrow, but their cost must be paid anyway: think of the development of drugs or softwares to fight biological or digital viruses. If the partners in the joint venture have heterogenous goals, some may end up achieving their goal while others don't. Our model proposes some simple rules to divide cost in such situations, based on the cost of each project, individual needs, and the random distribution of successes and failures.
We model the needs of user i by a set D i of subsets of A: she is "served" if and only if the set D of items actually working (successful projects) is in D i ; the only restriction is that if D i contains D it also contains any superset of D (the success of a project cannot hurt anyone). For instance, D i is the set of all those paths in a communication network providing user i with connectivity and D is one such path, or D i is the set of all those sets of R&D projects satisfying the goal of partner i in the joint venture etc.
The only dimension along which our users differ is the profile of individual needs. All agents have a large willingness to pay for service, and exactly how large is irrelevant; they are all risk neutral as well and share a common prior about successes and failures. Finally the cost of items is common knowledge and the agents cannot decline to pay the cost share assigned by the judge. These simplifications notwithstanding, our model is potentially complex because individual needs are described by arbitrary sets of subsets of items, a combinatorially complex object. Our approach is to impose three very strong separability properties on division rules, resulting in a simple structure where the impact of additional normative properties is transparent. This is standard fare in axiomatic cost sharing. However we do not take follow the familiar route applying the cooperative game methodology by computing the counterfactual "stand alone" costs, i.e., the efficient (minimal) cost of serving arbitrary subsets of agents (e.g., Moulin, 2002 , or Hougaard, 2009 ). Such optimizations are meaningless in the current set-up where coalition of agents cannot buy their cheapest subset of items. Our model is not "optimized", because we must divide the total cost of all items, even though it would be enough to pay for only a subset of these. Hougaard and Moulin (2014) already argue in those terms against the conventional game theoretic approach.
Ex Post versus Ex Ante: Because the outcome of the joint venture is risky, we can take an ex ante or an ex post point of view to think about fairness. Applying our conception of fairness before, or after the resolution of uncertainties will not lead to the same outcomes.
Consider a simple example with two items a, b of identical cost 1, such that with equal probability 1 2 , either a succeeds and b fails, or b succeeds and a fails. Bob is served in both cases, while Ann is served if a succeeds and only then. For simplicity we write
which only lists of serving subsets minimal for inclusion; any superset of these (for instance the full set ab) is still a serving set.
One approach is to divide cost in proportion to ex ante probabilities of service, 1 2 for Ann and 1 for Bob, taking these as proxies for ex ante utilities. This suggests the shares (1/3, 2/3). However if we focus on the ex post realization of the items it appears that shares should be (1/2, 1/2) if a works and both agents are served, or (0, 1) if b works and only Bob is served. Averaging with probability 1/2 for each case gives the shares (1/4, 3/4).
The great advantage of the second, ex post approach is captured by the axiom Independence of Timing (IT). Given a cost sharing rule we compare its outcome computed at time 0 before the realization of any project and the application of that same rule to each situation that could occur at time 1, after the success or failure of all projects is known. The rule is independent of timing if, at time 0, the cost shares computed at time 0 coincide with the expectation of these shares computed at time 1. In our example the cost shares in the two deterministic situations feasible at time 1 are compelling, thus IT forces the shares (1/4, 3/4) at time 0.
Interpreting flexible needs: The flexibility of individual needs is obviously relevant to determine individual liabilities toward costs, but the direction of this effect may be ambiguous under risk. Bob is more flexible, easier to serve, than Carol if Bob's service sets D Bob contains strictly Carol's D Carol . Consider again two items a, b but this time assume each succeeds with probability p and these events are independent. Assume Bob is still served if either of them works, D Bob = [a, b], while Carol needs both items to work, D Carol = [ab]. On the one hand Bob is less dependent upon any particular item than Carol hence he should be less liable than her for the cost of each item; on the other hand he is more likely to be served than her and this suggests he should pay more. The latter argument is especially convincing if reliability p is low, because then Carol stands much less of a chance of service than Bob; the former argument is more convincing if reliability is high, for instance if p = 1, because then they are both served and it is Carol's fault that we had to pay for two items instead of one.
In the example of the previous subsection Bob is also more flexible than Ann, but she does not care for b so Bob should bear more of its cost. On the other hand Ann is entirely dependent upon a so she should pay more of it than Bob.
Two more axioms: Beyond Independence of Timing, we need two more strong separability properties to determine a tractable family of cost sharing rules. The first property, Cost Additivity (CA), is surely the most common requirement in the cost sharing literature of the last three decades (see e.g. Moulin, 2002) . It implies that we must assign shares in the cost of any item independently of its actual cost. The second property, Separability Across Items (SAI), ensures that in a deterministic problem (where each item either works or fails for sure) the cost shares of a given item a depend only upon the partition of the agents in three groups: those who are served if and only if a is available, those who are served even when a fails, and those who are not served even if a succeeds.
Applying the standard cooperative game methodology to our problem results in rules violating both CA and SAI. For instance a version of the Shapley value meeting IT obtains by computing, for each realization of the random projects, the stand alone costs of each coalition of agents, then applying the value in each such deterministic game before taking expectations over the realizationsor equivalently taking expectations of the stand alone costs before applying the value to the "expected game". See a numerical example in the next subsection and a formal definition in the Appendix. But this violates CA because stand alone costs are not linear in costs; moreover it is harder to compute and to interpret than the two rules we propose here.
Two cost sharing rules: We propose and axiomatize two cost sharing rules, that differ mainly in their treatment of needs flexibility. The Ex Post Service rule simply divides total cost equally between all agents served ex post (if no one is served it divides costs equally among everybody). Although it is cost additive, this rule ignores differences in the costs of different items. The Needs Priority rule is more subtle, in that it computes the liability item per item, and uses the information contained in the 3-partition mentioned in the previous subsection.
In the example with two items a, b paid for by Ann and Bob with needs
, suppose that each item succeeds independently with probability 2/3. Bob is more liable for b since b does not help Ann at all, however both our rules charge Ann a positive share of b's cost for two reasons: if a works then Bob does not need b either; and if nothing works, nobody is served and they must split the bill equally. We show in section 5.1 that the Needs Priority rule shares a as (11/18, 7/18) and b as (7/18, 11/18), while the Ex Post Service rule divides total cost as (7/18, 11/18 Characterization result: Beyond the structural independence properties discussed above, our characterization results rely on three simple tests of fairness. Liable for Flexibility insists that if Ann is easier to serve than Bob, she will not pay less than him: it drives a wedge between our two benchmark rules, as Needs Priority fails it while Ex Post Service meets it. Say that agent i needs item a single-mindedly if D ∈ D i ⇐⇒ a ∈ D (every other item is useless to her); then Liable for Single-minded Needs requires this agent to pay the largest individual share of a. Say that item a is useless to agent i if whenever D serves his needs, so does D {a}. Our last axiom, Useless Free says that an agent does not pay for a if it is useless to him, while another agent needs it single-mindedly.
Among the rules meeting Cost Additivity, Separability Across Items, and Independence of Timing, the Ex Post Service rule is captured by the combination of Liable for Flexibility and Liable for Single-minded Needs, while the Needs Priority rule is captured by Useless Free.
Our punchline: After defining our two rules in section 5.1, we observe that they often both propose "coarse" divisions for deterministic problems. The convex combinations of the two rules still meet the three invariance axioms, and they balance at will the two notions of fairness embodied by these rules. However we do not offer an axiomatic characterization of the set of such convex combinations.
Relation to the literature: Our model extends earlier work by Moulin and Laigret (2011) and Hougaard and Moulin (2014) , both in the deterministic case where items always work.
ML consider the case where each item is indispensable to at least one agent, so no item is redundant. They characterize the method, dubbed the EqualNeed solution, dividing the cost of any item equally between all agents needing this item for service. Our Needs Priority rule applies the equal-need-equalshare principle of fairness in our richer model and coincides with Equal Need on deterministic non-redundant problems.
HM allow for redundant items and axiomatize the family of Counting rule(s): For each item agents pay in proportion to the fraction of minimal service sets including the item over the total number of minimal service sets. 2 In the deterministic case this not only provides cost shares for redundant items, but also more compelling shares for non-redundant problems than the Equal-Need solution. It also implies that higher flexibility in needs implies less liability in payment. As mentioned above this comonotonicity is no longer compelling for unreliable items. In fact, our Ex Post Service rule does exactly the opposite: more flexibility weakly increases one's share. Moreover, the natural risky version of a counting rule (taking expectations of deterministic problems) typically violates Separability Across Items (see (11) in the Appendix).
Independence of Timing was introduced by Myerson (1981) The Engineering literature discusses at length the optimal and fair allocation of network resources (see e.g., Julian et al., 2002 , Neely et al, 2008 . It focuses on traffic optimization when network capacity is exceeded and communication channels may fail, thus the thrust is completely different. A recent paper by Bergantinos and Martinez (2014) has some resemblance with our problem though. They consider cost sharing in trees where each agent (node) is a source with individual production and demand and argue that if production is unreliable it creates asymmetric liabilities for edges which matters for the fair division of costs. Every edge of the tree connects two components say A and B; if component A is able to cover its own demand as well as that of component B, but not vice versa, then B should pay for the connecting edge; if both can cover the total demand they split equally and so forth.
Content: Section 2 introduces the two polar ideas of ex ante or ex post fairness, and the key IT axiom, in a reduced model where cost is not differentiated per item. The general model where each item has its own cost is defined in Section 3. Section 4 introduces the three independence properties and characterizes the resulting family of cost sharing rules, under the natural requirements of symmetry in agents and projects: Proposition 1. Within this family Section 5 characterizes the Ex Post service and the Needs Priority rules by three additional fairness tests. Section 6 contains several numerical examples. Section 7 closes with an open question for future research. The Appendix defines formally the risky version of the Shapley value and the counting rules of HM.
Non separable cost: ex ante versus ex post
We introduce and contrast the two approaches in the simple version of our general model where the various projects cannot be differentiated by costs (due to production externalities), so the benevolent arbitrator only knows the total cost c to be shared. Then if the random variable ω describes the realization of the various projects, the only relevant information is the set of agents served at ω. Let Ω be the range of outcomes ω, with probability distribution p ∈ ∆(Ω). The needs of agent i ∈ N are described by a subset Ω i of Ω: if ω ∈ Ω i , agent i is served, otherwise not. We must then assign shares of c based on the data (Ω, Ω i , i ∈ N, p).
For instance a consortium of companies share the cost of a license to explore a plot of land for minerals or other natural resources, when each company looks for a different set of minerals; or they share the cost of launching a satellite that will attempt to collect different types of data; or they build a partially reliable communication network with non separable costs; and so on.
We compare two cost sharing rules: The ex-ante rule charges the users in proportion to their ex-ante probability of being served. Thus agent i's share is
The ex-post rule charges equally the agents served ex post; that is, it computes the expectation of these shares with respect to ω. To write it formally we use the In both rules i's cost share increases weakly as Ω i increases. But note that an agent i with zero probability of service, p(Ω i ) = 0, is not charged under the ex ante rule (provided p(∪ i Ω i ) > 0), whereas under the ex post rule she will be charged some positive share if p(
The difference between the two rules is very clear when individual needs are nested as Ω 1 ⊆ Ω 2 ⊆ · · · ⊆ Ω n , so agent 1 is the least and n the most flexible.
, with the conventions Ω 0 = ∅ and q n+1 = 1−p(Ω n ), we compute
If Ω n = Ω this is reminiscent of the celebrated airport landing game (Thomson, 2007 , contains a survey), by interpreting p(Ω i ) as the cost of serving i. Then y xa charges in proportion to individual Stand Alone costs, and y xp according to the Shapley value of the Stand Alone cost game.
Note that the cost shares of the ex-ante rule are more equally distributed than those of the ex-post rule:
3 That agent n prefers the ex-ante rule while agent 1 holds the opposite view holds more generally if Ω 1 ⊆ Ω i for all i, and Ω n = Ω: the least flexible agent prefers the ex-post rule while the most flexible one prefers the ex-ante rule.
The two rules react very differently to the arrival of new information about the outcome of some projects, leading to an update of the distribution p. Under the ex-ante rule, this update typically upsets the distribution of shares: in the nested example above, we just noted that agent 1 prefers to wait until the outcome is fully revealed. By contrast under the ex-post rule everyone is indifferent between dividing costs based on the distribution p, or waiting until p can be updated. Mathematically this corresponds to the property that cost shares are an affine function of probabilities. The formal statement is the axiom Independence of Timing, presented in section 4.2 below for our general model.
In the reduced model of this section with a non separable cost, the ex post rule is clearly characterized by IT plus the assumption that in a deterministic problem the cost is split equally by all served agents. But in the general model with separable costs to which we now turn, we need much more than IT to pin down specific rules.
The model
The finite set A contains the risky projects and each project a ∈ A has a nonnegative cost c a . The projects are public goods that can be consumed without rivalry by the agents in N. Nature chooses the set X, ∅ ⊆ X ⊆ A, of successful projects. Irrespective of the realization of X, all agents must share the total cost c A = a∈A c a .
The needs of agent i ∈ N are described by a non empty set D i ⊆ 2 A of service sets: agent i is served if and only if the subset of projects actually working is in
Two extreme service sets that will play a role in the axioms are D i = ∅ for an agent who never gets service, and D i = 2 A for an agent who gets service irrespective of the realized outcome.
Definition 1: A cost allocation problem under risk is a list (Q, p, c) where
is the profile of needs, p ∈ ∆(2 A ) is the probability distribution of the set X of successful projects, and c ∈ R A + is the vector of project costs. Definition 2: A cost allocation rule assigns to any problem (Q, p, c) a vector of cost shares y(Q, p, c) ∈ R n + such that i∈N y i = c A .
3 This follows from the following fact: if x, y ∈ R n + are increasingly ordered with i x i = i y i and Starting with a problem (Q, p, c) in the sense of Definition 1, we can always ignore the separation of costs across items and only retain the total cost c A . If we then set Ω = 2
A and Ω i = D i we have an instance of the simpler model of the previous section: thus the ex ante and ex post rules immediately generalize Ex-ante Service rule:
Ex-post Service rule:
where S(Q; X) = {i ∈ N |X ∈ D i } is the set of agents served by X, and e[S] is the uniform lottery on S, with the important convention e[∅] = e[N ].
Consider for instance the two-item, two-person example where
and with probability 0.9 item a works but b fails, while with probability 0.1 item b works and a fails. Then the shares of total cost are approximately equal in both methods: y xa = (0.47, 0.53)c A ; y xp = (0.45, 0.55)c A . However if we learn that b is very much more expensive than a, it makes sense to charge significantly more to Bob (as our Needs Priority rule will) because he is more liable for b than a, and most of the costs come from b.
We give now two large families of examples, illustrating the potential combinatorial complexity of our model.
Routing/connectivity needs on a network:
A is the set of edges of an undirected communication network, each with limited reliability. Typical needs of an agent require X to contain at least one path between two specific nodes; or a path avoiding certain edges and/or nodes (for privacy concerns); or two edge-disjoint paths (to allow two independent communications); etc..
Here the Ex-ante Service rule shares total cost in proportion to the network reliability index discussed in the Operations Research literature (e.g., Ball (1979) ).
Fighting (biological or digital) viruses:
V is a set of viruses. Item a is a software that will neutralize the subset V (a) ⊆ V of viruses. Agent i is infected by a subset of viruses T i ⊆ V , so she is cured if and only if the set X of successful softwares is such that
It is easy to see that this model encompasses our general model: any cost allocation problem in Definition 1 can be written as a virus problem for an appropriate choice of V and T i . We omit the straightforward proof for the sake of brevity. 
where ∆(N ) is the N -simplex and y(a; Q, p) ∈ ∆(N ) specifies how to share the cost of project a.
Both the Ex-ante and the Ex-post service rules are examples of cost additive allocation rules.
Recall from the example in Section 1 that the Shapley value adapted to the risky context is not cost additive. The precise definition of this rule is in the Appendix.
Independence of Timing
Suppose the uncertainty about success of failure of the items is described by a composed distribution r = λp + (1 − λ)q (where r, p, q ∈ ∆(2 A ) and λ ∈]0, 1[). Then we require that settling shares at time 0 given r, or waiting to compute shares till time 1 when either p or q is realized, yields the same expected shares at time 0: Independence of Timing (IT): For p, q ∈ ∆(2 A ) and λ ∈ [0, 1]
This implies that payments are additively separable in the set of successful projects X (as in a classic von Neuman-Morgenstern setting).
Together CA and IT characterize the family of rules (4) with shares of the form y(a; Q, p) =
where y * (a, Q, X) is the way our rule divides the cost of a when the deterministic outcome of the projects is that those in X succeed and only those.
The Ex-post service rule (3) is clearly of the form (5), so this rule meets IT. So does the Shapley value discussed above and defined in the Appendix. So does the rule that we call the Expected Counting Liability rule: for each set X it divides costs in proportion to the counting liability index of Hougaard and Moulin (2014); see (11) in the Appendix for details.
The Ex-ante service rule (2) fails independence of timing.
Separability Across Items
Our third independence axiom bears on the impact of item b over the cost shares of other items a, evaluated when item b is deterministic (always works or always fails) and costless. For a cost additive rule the axiom takes a simpler form: for all b and ε = 0, 1
When b fails (resp. works) for sure, the shares of item a depend only upon the projected service profiles Q(b = ε) and probabilities p b=ε . Both the Ex-ante and Ex-post Service rules satisfy Separability Across Items. The expected counting liability rule (see Appendix), and the Shapley value rule do not satisfy SAI.
Putting the three properties together
We need additional notation to express the consequences of our three independence properties. Let T be the set of ordered 3-partitions τ = (T − , T 0 , T + ) of N where up to two subsets can be empty, and Θ be the set of triples of non negative integers θ = (θ − , θ 0 , θ + ) of sum n. The cardinality of τ ∈ T is |τ | = (|T − |, |T 0 |, |T + |) ∈ Θ. Let Γ be the set of mappings γ from Θ into R 3 + such that
Each γ in Γ defines a mapping g from T into ∆(N ) as follows. For any τ ∈ T
We write G for the set of such mappings g. Intuitively g assigns individual shares based only on the cardinality of the partition, and the membership in the partition. It is fully symmetric: if agents i ∈ T ε1 and j ∈ T ε2 swap membership (so the new partition has T ε1 = T ε1 + j − i etc..), their shares are swapped as well and other agents are unaffected.
Recall that S(Q; X) = {i ∈ N |X ∈ D i } is the set of agents served if X is realized. When X contains a, we let S a (Q; X) = S(Q; X) S(Q; X {a}) be the set of agents served at X for whom the success of project a is critical: they would not be served if project a had failed.
Given a profile of needs Q, an item a, and a subset of items X, we define the partition τ (a; Q, X) ∈ T as follows:
is the set of agents that are not served (resp. are served), irrespective of the success or failure of a; and T 0 is the set of agents who are served if and only if a succeeds. A cost allocation rule is Symmetric in A if cost shares do not change when we exchange the cost of two items entering symmetrically in Q. A cost allocation rule is Symmetric in N if two agents with identical needs pay the same. Fix Q, X ⊆ A and a, and recall that in equation (5) y * (a, Q, X) = y(a; Q, δ X ) where δ X ∈ ∆(2 A ) picks X with probability 1. When we apply SAI repeatedly to all items b in A {a}, with b = 0 if b / ∈ X ∪ {a} and b = 1 if b ∈ X {a}, the profile of needs shrinks to
the corresponding probability is
and we have y * (a; X; Q) = y(a; Q, δ X ) = y(a; Q, p)
As p is determined by a in or out of X, we get
Now each D i is a possibly empty subset of 2 {a} , and three of these four subsets correspond to inclusion monotonic needs: the empty set, the singleton {a}, and 2
{a} . In our notation keeping only the inclusion minimal elements of
. Distinguish these three cases:
: agent i is served at X, even if we switch a from success to failure. Thus Q is entirely described by the partition τ (a, Q, X) = (T − , T 0 , T + ) of N , and for ε = −, + we can write g ε as g ε (a, τ (a; Q, X)). Symmetry in A implies that the first a does not matter, and symmetry in N implies that g ε takes the form (7) for some γ ∈ Γ, i.e., g ε ∈ G. Thus we reach the desired form (8) . In the converse statement we only check that the allocation rule (8) meets SAI. Fix a problem (Q, p) and two outcomes a, b where p(b) = 1. Then for any X containing b, it is easy to check that τ (a; Q, X) = τ (a; Q(b = 1), X {b}), and p b=1 (X {b}) = p(X): property (6) for ε = 1 follows. The proof for ε = 0 is similar.
Note that the family characterized in Proposition 2 is closed by convex combinations.
Two special rules and their characterization

Definition
The Ex Post Service rule (3) is the special case of (8) where
The Needs Priority rule is given by (8) and
If project a fails the two rules share its cost equally between all agents served ex post: shares are e[T + ]. When a succeeds, Needs Priority charges only those agents who are served if and only if a is provided (that is agents in T 0 = S a (Q; X)), and if there are no such agents, it charges all agents served at X.
Both rules have a compact expression. For Ex Post Service we apply (3):
For Needs Priority we use the notation e[S 1 ;
We illustrate our two rules in the two-item two-agent examples discussed in the introduction, starting with the deterministic case where all items work: the difference between the two rules is especially stark in that case.
In the problem with D Bob = [a, b] and D Carol = [ab] both items are critical to Carol (i.e., A x / ∈ D Carol ) and none is to Bob, so if all items work (p(A) = 1) Needs Priority gives Bob free ride on both items and Carol pays everything, while Ex Post Service ignores all differences in needs and split costs equally. Both outcomes are extremist: the former is too hard to Carol, because Bob still needs some item, and the latter too easy on her since Bob's flexibility is not rewarded. Now assume items a and b have IID probability of success 2/3. Then the Ex Post Service rule picks cost shares (13/18, 5/18): Bob pays everything when exactly one item works (with probability 4/9) and costs are split equally otherwise. Interestingly the Needs Priority rule splits costs equally. Consider item a: if both items work it is critical to Carol only; if only one item works it is critical to Bob only; and if no item works they split equally. As the probability of two items working, and that of just one working are equal to 4/9, we end up with equal split. But if the IID probability of success is above (resp. below) 2/3, then Carol (resp. Bob) pays more.
The second problem has
In the deterministic case (p(A) = 1) the two rules are, again, very coarse: Needs Priority charges all of a to Ann and shares b equally; while Ex Post Service splits all costs equally. But with IID probability of success 2/3, they are much more nuanced. Ex Post Service splits costs as (7/18, 11/18): Bob pays more because he is easier to serve. Needs Priority shares a as (11/18, 7/18) and b as (7/18, 11/18): it makes sense to view Ann as more liable for item a than Bob, and the opposite inequality for item b.
Remark: The Ex Post Service rule and the Needs Priority rule are Population Monotonic:
When utilisation of the items is excludable, this allows strategyproof elicitation of the agents' ex ante willingness to pay, as in Moulin and Shenker (2001).
Some simple fairness tests
We fix a problem (Q, p, c) throughout the definitions below. In the first two definitions y ∈ R N + refers to total cost shares over all items.
× c A If ex post at least one agent is served, then an agent never served pays nothing. It is compelling, and clearly satisfied for any rule of the form (8) (including both rules above) when g + , g − does not charge T − provided T 0 ∪ T + is non empty.
Liable for Flexibility (FLEX): if
This property drives a wedge between our two rules: the inclusion means that i' s needs are more flexible than j's, in particular i is more likely to be served, and the axiom assigns a (weakly bigger) liability to i than to j. While Ex Post Service clearly meets this property, Needs Priority fails it (see Example 3 below).
In the next two axioms we assume for simplicity that our allocation rule is Cost Additive, so we can speak of the cost shares y(a) for a particular item. 4 We call agent i single-minded on item a if X ∈ D i ⇐⇒ a ∈ X : the success of a is all that matters to agent i. Liable for Single-minded Needs (SMN): if i is single-minded on item a and p(a ∈ X) = 1, then y i (a) = max j∈N y j (a)
This property is uncontroversial and clearly true for both our rules. We call item a useless to agent
Useless is Free (UF): if a is useless to i while j is single minded on a, and p(a ∈ X) = 1, then y i (a) = 0
Needs priority meets this property: agent j is in T 0 for any X containing a, while agent i is in T − ∪ T + . But Ex Post Service does not: even i for whom a is useless will contribute to the cost of a if she is served. Proof We already checked that Ex Post Service meets NCNS, FLEX, and SMN; and that Needs Priority meets NCNS and UF. Conversely we fix a rule in the form (8) and we check the impact of the four fairness tests.
Characterization result
Step 1 NCNS implies that g + does not charge T − (unless T − = N ) and
Fix τ ∈ T with T − and T 0 ∪ T + both non empty. Fix A, a and X such that a ∈ X and construct a problem (Q, p) such that p( X) = 1, and
so that T − = N S(Q; X), T 0 = S a (Q; X), and T + = S(Q; X {a}) and (8) gives the shares y(a, Q, p) = g + (τ ). On the other hand NCNS implies that T − pays nothing, so we conclude that g + does not charge T − . Next we fix τ ∈ T and choose A, a, X (non empty) such that a / ∈ X. We choose similarly a problem (Q, p) such that p( X) = 1 and
so that y(a, Q, p) = g − (τ ) while NCNS says that: if T + = ∅ then agents in T − ∪ T 0 pay nothing, while if T + = ∅ all agents share equally the cost of a. This is the desired conclusion.
Step 2 UF implies that g + does not charge T + if T 0 = ∅ Fix τ ∈ T with T 0 = ∅ and A, a, X s. t. a ∈ X and X {a} = ∅. Similarly to step 1 we construct (Q, p) s. t. p( X) = 1, and
• each j ∈ T 0 is single minded on a
• for each i ∈ T + we have X {a} ∈ D i and in fact a is useless to i so that y(a, Q, p) = g + (τ ) and by UF g + does not charge T + .
Step 3 SMN implies that g + charges weakly more to agents in T 0 than to those in T + Fix τ ∈ T with T 0 and T + both non empty. The same construction as in step 2 (where for i ∈ T + we only need X {a} ∈ D i ) gives y(a, Q, p) = g + (τ ) and by SMN g
Step 4 FLEX implies that g + charges weakly more to agents in T + than to those in T 0
Fix τ ∈ T with T 0 and T + both non empty. The same construction as in step 3 for T − and T 0 , and
• for each i ∈ T + D i contains X {a} as well as all supersets of {a} gives y(a, Q, p) = g + (τ ) and by FLEX g
Step 5 Now statement i) follows by combining Steps 1,3 and 4. while statement ii) follows from steps 1 and 2.
Numerical examples
The four examples below involve three or four items, and their first message is that introducing limited reliability results in fairly complicated sets of shares, compared to the deterministic case. While both our solutions often recommend somewhat extreme outcomes for the deterministic case, they are more compelling in the probabilistic context. Taking a convex combination of the two rules is a reasonable way to balance the two fairness principles they implement: for instance, in example 1, the obvious compromise puts equal weight on the Ex-Post Service and the Needs Priority rules.
Throughout this section, we assume that p is IID with a probability of success q for each project. Thus, p(X) = q |X| (1 − q) |A\X| , where |X| is the cardinality of X. 
The Ex Post Service rule gives the following cost shares;
3 ) The Needs Priority rule gives the following cost shares for each project; Figure 2 below shows that the Ex-Post Service rule makes the agents share equally in the extreme cases of q = 0 and q = 1 while otherwise agent 1 pays less than agent 2, who pays less than agent 3. So clearly the ex-post rule punishes the most flexible agent (agent 3). The Needs Priority rule, on the other hand, gives different cost shares for each project. The shares of Project a are given in Figure 3a . Note that in the deterministic case (q = 1) agent 1 pays everything while agents 2 and 3 free ride. Otherwise payments vary.
The shares of Project b are given in Figure 3b . Note that in the extreme cases (q ∈ {0, 1}) agents share equally while otherwise agent 1 always pays the smallest share with shares of 2 and 3 varying.
The shares of Project c are given in Figure 3c . Again, in the deterministic cases (q ∈ {0, 1}) agents share equally while otherwise payments are ordered such that agent 1 pays less than 2, who pays less than 3. Using the Ex-Post Service rule gives cost shares;
3 ) Using the Needs Priority rule gives the following cost shares for each project; Figure 4 shows that using the Ex-Post Service rule makes agent 3 pay less than 2, who pays less than agent 1. In the extreme cases of q ∈ {0, 1} agents share equally. Clearly, this is the consequence of agent 1 being most flexible this time. This picture repeats itself for project a when using the Needs Priority rule, while it is more complex in case of projects b and c. In both cases agents share equally when q = 0, whereas for q = 1, in the former case agent 1 free rides (with 2 and 3 sharing equally) and in the latter case agents 1 and 2 free rides. In the deterministic cases (q ∈ {0, 1}) the three agents should clearly split costs equally since all have 2-connectivity in the loop. Yet, with limited reliability things are not as simple.
Using the Ex-Post Service rule gives cost shares; y xp = 1 3 (1 + q − 2q 2 + q 3 , 1 − 2q + 4q 2 − 2q 3 , 1 + q − 2q 2 + q 3 ) Clearly, agents 1 and 3 are symmetric so they pay the same. In the extreme cases q ∈ {0, 1} all share equally. Otherwise agent 2 pays less than 1 and 3 as illustrated in Figure 6 below. Using the Needs Priority rule gives the following cost shares for edges a and b; y np (a) = Figures 7a and b below, show the payments of the Needs Priority rule for edges a and b respectively. It appears that for edge a, agent 1 pays more than agent 3, who pays more than agent 2 for all values of q ∈ (0, 1). This makes sense since agent 1 ought to be more liable than agent 3 for his direct connection to the source. The picture is more complicated looking at the edge b where payments vary substantially between agents according to the value of q: For low reliabilities (q < 0.4) agent 1 pays more than 3, who pays more than 2 (agent 1 and 3 both have higher probability of getting service than 2 and should accordingly pay more). For high reliabilities (q > 0.6) agent 2 pays more than 1, who pays more than 3 (agent 2 is now the agent who needs b the most and should accordingly pay more than 1 and 3). 2. Cost sharing rules for risky items suggest simple rules for deterministic items. For any IID probability of success q the corresponding Ex Post service and Needs Priority rules can be viewed as cost sharing rules parametrized by p for deterministic problems. For instance pick q = 1/2 so all probabilities p(X) are equal and the Needs Priority rule becomes the deterministic rule y(a, Q) = 1 2 |A| ∅⊆X⊆A e[S(Q; X) S(Q; X a); S(Q; X)] This is reminiscent of the Shapley value: instead of taking expectation over all possible orderings of agents we take expectation over all possible subsets of items. It would be quite interesting to derive a deterministic characterization of this rule.
where D i (a, X) is the set of i's minimal service sets containing item a given realizations X, and with the convention 
